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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This interlocutory appeal authorized by Rule 23(f) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presents us with two 
significant questions.  First, did the District Court err in 
certifying a class of Citizens Bank (N.A.) Mortgage Loan 
Officers from ten different states who bring claims alleging 
that they were unlawfully denied overtime pay?  And second, 
may we exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s order certifying a collective action under § 
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b), an otherwise non-appealable order?  We hold that the 
District Court’s class certification decision cannot stand and 
that we may not consider the merits of the decision to certify a 
collective action under the FLSA.    
I. BACKGROUND 
Between November 2012 and April 2017, Plaintiffs, 
working as Mortgage Loan Officers (MLOs) at Citizens, were 
responsible for bringing in business by generating customer 
leads, completing loan applications, and building a book of 
business of referrals for new mortgage lending opportunities.    
To facilitate fulfillment of their work responsibilities, Citizens 
afforded MLOs considerable flexibility to determine their own 
working hours and where to perform their work.   
Citizens paid MLOs in three ways.  First, MLOs 
received a base salary of $11.50 an hour.  Second, some MLOs, 
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depending on their eligibility, earned a monthly commission 
based on the number of loan products sold in a given month.  
Third, and most relevant to this appeal, MLOs were entitled to 
overtime pay by virtue of their “non-exempt” status under 
federal and state wage-and-hour laws, including the FLSA.    
As non-exempt employees, MLOs were entitled to 1.5 times 
their base wage of $11.50/hour ($17.25/hour) for each hour 
worked in excess of forty during a given workweek.    See 29 
C.F.R. § 778.107.   
On paper, the process for requesting overtime payments 
worked as follows: MLOs recorded their hours in a 
computerized timekeeping application.  A typical work day 
included four separate entries: “the morning clock-in; a clock-
out and clock-in for the lunch period; and the evening clock-
out.”  (App. 106).  MLOs were required to submit their total 
hours worked in a particular week by Sunday at midnight.  A 
Producing Sales Manager—who oversaw the work of eight 
individual MLOs—was responsible for ensuring the accuracy 
and completeness of the timesheet information.  Under this 
“Time Sheet Policy,” the Producing Sales Manager was 
required to approve any hours the MLOs submitted by Monday 
at noon, i.e., the day after MLOs were required to submit their 
hours.   
While the Time Sheet Policy obligated MLOs to report 
all hours worked, including overtime, a separate but related 
policy governed an MLO’s ability to work overtime.  
Specifically, each MLO’s letter of employment contained a 
provision stating that the MLO was “required to obtain prior 
approval from [his or her] supervisor for any hours worked in 
excess of 40 hours per week.”  (Appellant’s Br. 13) (citations 
omitted).  If an MLO disregarded this policy by not seeking 
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approval of overtime hours, the MLO could be subject to 
discipline.   
According to Plaintiffs, Citizens’ on-paper overtime 
policy was a ruse.  In reality, Plaintiffs aver, Citizens endorsed 
a “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” i.e., the company maintained 
an unofficial, companywide policy of requiring MLOs to work 
in excess of 40 hours per week while discouraging MLOs from 
actually reporting those overtime hours.  This practice, 
Plaintiffs contend, was carried out at Citizens “through a 
single, coordinated, overarching scheme.”  (Appellees’ Br. 5).  
As outlined by Plaintiffs, the scheme consisted of the following 
measures: 
(1) an overtime preapproval policy, 
whereby MLOs would be subject to 
discipline if they reported overtime 
without having it preapproved; 
(2) restrictions on the amount of overtime 
hours that managers could approve; 
(3) allowing MLOs to submit fictitious 
attendance records that block-reported 
time and did not show night or weekend 
work through management’s violations of 
Citizens’ attendance monitoring and 
timesheet approval policies; and 
(4) upper-level management’s tracking of 
overtime reported and 
discouragement/harassment/discipline of 
MLOs who reported or requested 
overtime. 
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(Id. at 7).   
 In November 2015, three former MLOs—Alex Renig, 
Ken Gritz, and Bob Soda—filed a class action complaint 
alleging that Citizens, by maintaining “an unofficial policy or 
practice requiring MLOs to work ‘off the clock[]’ in excess of 
forty hours per week,” failed to pay overtime wages in 
accordance with the FLSA and Pennsylvania law.  (App. 101).  
Because this work went unreported, Plaintiffs claimed that they 
were not paid for their off-the-clock hours in violation of the 
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, and Pennsylvania’s wage-and-hour 
law, 43 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 260.1 et seq., and § 333.101 
et seq.   
Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a 
collective action under the FLSA,1 which the District Court 
                                              
1 “The FLSA establishes a federal minimum-wage, 
maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be 
modified by contract.”  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 
569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013).  Under § 216(b), the so-called 
collective action provision of the FLSA, employees may “bring 
a private cause of action on their own behalf and on behalf of 
‘other employees similarly situated’ for specified violations of 
the FLSA.”  Id.  Similarly, aggrieved employees may also 
commence a “class action” under Federal Rule 23 which 
permits “a class representative” to bring suit for violations of 
other state and federal law on behalf of those in the same class 
and who “possess the same interest and suffer the same 
injury[.]”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 
(2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Employees bringing collective actions under the FLSA and 
those bringing class actions under Rule 23 must be granted 
certification by the district court in order for their action to 
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proceed as a “collective action” or “class action,” respectively.  
See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590–
91 (3d Cir. 2012); Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 
842 F.3d 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2016).  However, as further 
discussed in Part C, infra, the certification process and 
standards for collective actions and class actions differ.  For 
example, unlike class actions under Rule 23, collective actions 
under the FLSA must first be “conditionally” certified by the 
district court, which “requires a named plaintiff to make a 
‘modest factual showing’—something beyond mere 
speculation—to demonstrate a factual nexus between the 
manner in which the employer’s alleged policy affected him or 
her and the manner in which it affected the proposed collective 
action members.”  Halle, 842 F.3d at 224 (quoting Zavala, 691 
F.3d at 536 n.4).  Once a district court grants conditional 
certification, putative class members are provided an 
opportunity to opt into the case pursuant to § 216(b).  Id. at 
225.  “This ‘opt-in’ requirement—mandating that each 
individual must file an affirmative consent to join the collective 
action—is the most conspicuous difference between the FLSA 
collective action device and a class action under Rule 23.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “This difference means that every plaintiff 
who opts in to a collective action has a party status, whereas 
unnamed class members in Rule 23 class actions do not.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  As relevant to this case, Citizens claims that 
the District Court erred when it granted final collective action 
certification based on its finding that the opt-in plaintiffs were 
“similarly situated” to the named plaintiffs, i.e., that all 
plaintiffs “‘were subjected to some common employer practice 
that, if proved, would help demonstrate a violation of the 
FLSA.’”  Id. at 225–26 (quoting Zavala, 691 F.3d at 538).  
Conversely, the Rule 23 certification process involves a two-
8 
 
granted in May 2016.  The District Court then ordered 
Plaintiffs to serve notice to the conditional FLSA class 
informing them that they would have 100 days to opt in to the 
action.  In accordance with the District Court’s order, Plaintiffs 
sent notice to over 1,000 current and former MLOs.  Of those, 
351 filed consent forms opting in to the FLSA collective 
action.      
After the 100-day period expired, Plaintiffs filed an 
amended complaint that added nine named plaintiffs to the 
lawsuit.  In conjunction with the amended complaint, Plaintiffs 
filed a motion for class certification under Rule 23, seeking 
certification of ten distinct classes, each of which alleged 
claims under the laws of their respective states.    Citizens 
responded with two separate, but related, motions:  one 
opposing the class certification motion and the other seeking 
decertification of the FLSA collective action.2   
The parties, via stipulation, agreed to the appointment 
of a Special Master to address the pending motions.  The 
Special Master recommended denying Citizens’ motion for 
summary judgment, certifying Plaintiffs’ off-the-clock claims 
under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), and denying Citizens’ motion 
for decertification of the FLSA collective action.  The District 
                                              
step procedure outlined in the text of the Rule itself, see 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 590 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)–(b)), as 
discussed in more detail in Part B, infra.   
  
2  The parties also cross-moved for summary judgment.  
The District Court granted summary judgment in Citizens’ 
favor as to Plaintiffs’ so-called “Recapture Claims,” (see App. 
49-50), but denied Citizens’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ off-the-
clock claims, at issue in this appeal.  
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Court adopted the Special Master’s reports and 
recommendations (hereinafter “SM Reports”) in full.  Citizens 
then timely filed a Rule 23(f) petition, which we granted.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
 The District Court had original jurisdiction over 
Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Because we granted Citizens’ Rule 23(f) 
petition, we have jurisdiction over the District Court’s Rule 23 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).  “We review the grant 
of class certification for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if 
the certification ‘rests upon clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
to fact.’”  In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 
185 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
An additional question raised in this appeal is whether 
we have pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s FLSA certification order, a question of first impression 
for our Court.  As a general matter, an order certifying a 
collective action under the FLSA is non-final and therefore not 
reviewable.  See Halle, 842 at 227.  However, under certain 
limited circumstances, the Court may, in its discretion, exercise 
pendent appellate jurisdiction “over issues that are not 
independently appealable[.]”  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 
F.3d 187, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 382 (3d Cir. 1997)).  For 
the reasons stated in Part C, infra, we decline to exercise 
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pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
Order granting final collective certification under the FLSA.   
III. DISCUSSION 
On appeal, Citizens argues that the District Court erred 
in certifying Plaintiffs’ state-law claims under Rule 23.  
Although we express reservations about the District Court’s 
ultimate findings, we cannot say at this juncture that the 
District Court abused its discretion in certifying the putative 
class based upon the record before us.  Rather, we find only 
that the District Court failed to provide a sufficiently rigorous 
analysis to support its conclusions and will therefore vacate 
and remand its order granting class certification under Rule 23. 
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  To invoke this exception, 
every purported class action must satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 23.  See id.   
Courts determine whether class certification is 
appropriate by conducting a two-step analysis.  First, the court 
must ascertain whether the putative class has satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 23(a).  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 590 (citing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)–(b)).   And second, the court must 
determine whether the requirements of Rule 23(b) have been 
met.  Id.  To satisfy Rule 23(a), the purported class must 
establish that there are “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)).  If the district court is 
satisfied that Rule 23(a)’s requirements are met, then it must 
proceed to the second step and determine whether “the class 
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fits within one of the three categories of class actions in Rule 
23(b).”3  Id.   
                                              
3  Rule 23(b) provides: 
 
 Types of Class Actions. A class action may be 
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual 
class members would create a risk of: 
 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual class members that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for 
the party opposing the class; or 
 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class 
members that, as a practical matter, would be 
dispositive of the interests of the other members 
not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests; 
 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so 
that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class 
as a whole; or 
 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and 
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Class certification is proper only if the district court is 
satisfied, “after a rigorous analysis,” that the plaintiffs 
“established each element of Rule 23 by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591.  When conducting the 
Rule 23 analysis, we have instructed that district courts 
“resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class 
certification, even if they overlap with the merits—including 
disputes touching on the elements of the [plaintiffs’ claims].’”  
Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide Litig., 552 F.3d at 307).  
                                              
that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings 
include: 
 
(A) the class members' interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; 
 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by 
or against class members; 
 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in 
the particular forum; and 
 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action.  
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.    
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Citizens contends that the District Court failed to 
properly “define the class or class claims” as mandated by Rule 
23(c)(1)(B).  (Appellant’s Br. 65-66).  Furthermore,  Citizens 
asserts that the District Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs’ 
evidence satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement, and 
that it incorrectly certified this class action under Rule 
23(b)(3).4  We address each of these contentions in turn.   
A. The Class Definition and the Claims to be Given Class 
Treatment 
Citizens argues that remand is necessary because the 
Court failed to “define the class or class claims” as mandated 
by Rule 23(c)(1)(B).  (Appellant’s Br. 65-66). Plaintiffs 
counter that the SM Reports “clearly set[] out the class 
definition, and defined the classes as ‘identified in the 
Amended Complaint[.]’”  (Appellees’ Br. 52).  We agree with 
Citizens and find that the certification order here is deficient.   
To satisfy Rule 23(c)(1)(B), an order granting class 
certification must include: “(1) a readily discernible, clear, and 
precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes 
to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and 
complete list of claims, issues or defense to be treated on a 
class basis.”  Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 
187–88 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Although a motion for class 
                                              
4  We need not consider Citizens’ contention that the 
District Court erred in certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2) 
for injunctive and declaratory relief because we conclude that 
remand is necessary based upon the District Court’s failure to 
properly define the class and claims to be certified under Rule 
23(c) and to conduct a sufficiently rigorous analysis as to Rule 
23(a) and (b)(3).  
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certification presents a discretionary question for a district 
court, the court ‘must clearly articulate its reasons, in part, so 
we can adequately review the certification decision on appeal 
under Rule 23(f).’”  Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 
F.3d 353, 369 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 
457 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
Our decision in Marcus is instructive on this issue.  In 
that case, after applying the Wachtel standard to the facts at 
issue, we held that the district court failed to satisfy Rule 
23(c)(1)(B) because the court’s order, “[r]ather than set[ting] 
out its own [class] definition,” merely stated that “the New 
Jersey sub-class is granted” and then cited to a docket entry for 
the plaintiff’s amended notice of motion for class certification.  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 592.  While recognizing that the district 
court and counsel may have “share[d] [an] understanding of 
the class definition,” we nevertheless emphasized that “post 
hoc clarification is no substitute for a readily discernible, clear, 
and precise statement of the parameters defining the class to be 
certified.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Additionally, we found that the district court’s failure to 
define the particular subclasses was augmented by its failure to 
provide a “readily discernible, clear, and complete list” of the 
claims and issues presented.”  Id.  Rule 23(c)(1)(B), we 
explained, is not satisfied when we are “force[d]” on appeal to 
“comb the entirety of the text and cobble together the various 
statements in search of . . . [a] readily discernible and complete 
list of class claims, issues, or defenses required by the Rule.”  
Id.  (quoting Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189).  Accordingly, we 
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
provide a “more clearly defined class and set of claims, issues, 
or defenses to be given class treatment.”  Id. 
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Here, as in Marcus, we are forced to comb through and 
cross-reference multiple documents in an attempt to cobble 
together the parameters defining the class and a complete list 
of the claims, issues, and defenses to be treated on a class basis.  
For example, there is no “readily discernible” statement or 
complete list of the required Rule 23(c)(1)(B) information in 
the District Court’s certification order.  Instead, just as the 
court’s order in Marcus merely stated that the “sub-class is 
granted,” the order here summarily grants certification after 
stating only that Plaintiffs’ “state law subclasses are for 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Illinois, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
and Ohio.” (App. 155 n.2).  Furthermore, as to the specific 
definition of the various subclasses, the certification order 
merely provided cross-references to Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Complaint and the SM Reports, without defining the specific 
subclasses or stating which provision of Rule 23 governs the 
various claims.  (Id. at 155 n.2).   
However, wading through the SM Reports proves 
equally unavailing.  The second report, like the report in 
Marcus, “does not define the claims, issues, or defense to be 
treated on a class basis at all.”  687 F.3d at 592.  Although the 
first report contained a class definition, it does so merely by 
cross-referencing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.   
Although we have declined to impose a strict format 
necessary to meet Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s requirements, we have 
explicitly rejected orders that force us to “cobble together . . . 
various statements” and “comb the entirety of its text” in search 
of “isolated statements that may add up to a partial list of class 
claims, issues, or defenses.”  Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 188 n.10, 
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189.5  The District Court’s order here requires us to do just that, 
and thus remand is warranted.   
B. Rule 23’s Commonality and Predominance Class 
Certification Prerequisites 
 Citizens contends that the District Court erred in 
finding that Plaintiffs’ evidence satisfied Rule 23(a)’s 
commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement.  Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement 
requires that the putative class members “share at least one 
question of fact or law in common with each other.”  In re 
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 258 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted).  “Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
element in turn requires that common issues predominate over 
issues affecting only individual class members.”  Id. at 528 
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). 
We have held that Rule 23(b)’s predominance 
requirement incorporates Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement because the former, although similar, is “far more 
demanding” than the latter.  Id.  Like the commonality 
requirement, “[p]redominance tests whether proposed classes 
are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
                                              
5  In Wachtel, we provided explicit guidance regarding 
best practices for drafting class certification orders.  See  453 
F.3d at 187 n.10 (stating that “the appearance within a 
certification order of a concise paragraph—similar to 
paragraphs often drafted to define the class itself and fully 
listing the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class 
basis—would come well within the parameters of the ‘readily 
discernible’ requirement”).   
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representation.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310–11 
(quotation omitted). However, the “predominance requirement 
imposes a more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to 
ensure that issues common to the class predominate over those 
affecting only individual class members.”6  Sullivan v. DB Inv., 
Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2011).  Accordingly, we will 
analyze the two elements together, with particular focus on the 
more stringent predominance requirement.  See, e.g., In re 
LifeUSA, 242 F.3d at 144 (evaluating the predominance and 
commonality requirements together) (citing Anchem Products, 
521 U.S. at 623–24).   
At the class certification stage, the predominance 
requirement is met only if the district court is convinced that 
“the essential elements of the claims brought by a putative class 
are ‘capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common 
to the class rather than individual to its members.’”  Gonzalez 
v. Corning, 885 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 2018); Tyson Foods, 
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (citation 
omitted).  In practice, this means that a district court must look 
first to the elements of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims and 
                                              
6  The predominance requirement also provides that 
“class resolution must be superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  In 
re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Anchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 
(1997)).  We will not discuss this particular facet of the 
requirement as the crux of Citizens’ argument, and, in turn, the 
bulk of Plaintiffs’ discussion, deals with whether the District 
Court, based on the representative evidence before it, could 
have found the class sufficiently cohesive so as to warrant a 
class action.    
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then, “through the prism” of Rule 23, undertake a “rigorous 
assessment of the available evidence and the method or 
methods by which [the] plaintiffs propose to use the evidence 
to prove” those elements.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (citing In 
re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir. 2011)).  “If 
proof of the essential elements of the [claim] requires 
individual treatment, then class certification is unsuitable.”  
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).   
To satisfy their wage-and-hour claims, Plaintiffs must 
show that: (1) pursuant to Citizens’ unwritten “policy-to-
violate-the-policy,” the class MLOs performed overtime work 
for which they were not properly compensated; and (2) 
Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of that policy 
and of the resulting uncompensated work.  See Kellar v. 
Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 177 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Reich v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 28 F.3d 1076, 
1082 (11th Cir. 1994)); see generally Davis v. Abington 
Memorial Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, 
to satisfy the predominance inquiry, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate (1) that Citizens’ conduct was common as to all 
of the class members, i.e., that Plaintiffs’ managers were 
carrying out a “common mode” of conduct vis-à-vis the 
company’s internal “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” and (2) that 
Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of this conduct.  
See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 299; Dukes, 564 U.S. at 358; see also 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (explaining that, although 
a plaintiff’s suit may raise “important questions common to all 
class members,” class certification is proper only if proof of 
the essential elements of the class members’ claims does not 
involve “person-specific inquiries into individual work time 
[that] predominate over the common questions”).   
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Here, Citizens contends that Plaintiffs’ representative 
evidence fails to satisfy either the commonality or 
predominance requirements because it is insufficient to 
“permit a reasonable jury to determine that high-level officers 
or executives of Citizens with responsibility for formulating 
companywide policies knew or should have known that each 
class member was working overtime off the clock, i.e., without 
reporting hours.”  (Appellant’s Br. 44).  This is so, Citizens 
claims, because each MLO’s experience is too individualized 
for a jury to reach a common answer regarding whether 
Citizens maintained a companywide policy against reporting 
overtime.  (Id.).  Plaintiffs disagree, contending that the record 
evidence is “more than sufficient” for a jury to conclude that 
“Citizens operated a ‘broader company policy’ to discourage 
MLOs from accurately reporting their overtime hours.”  
(Appellees’ Br. 31).   
In order for Plaintiffs’ representative evidence to satisfy 
the commonality/predominance requirements of Rule 23, that 
evidence must be sufficiently representative of the class as a 
whole such that each individual Plaintiff “could have relied on 
[the] sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an 
individual action.”  Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1046–47.  
That is to say, “[i]f the sample could have sustained a 
reasonable jury finding as to hours worked in each employee’s 
individual action, that sample is a permissible means of 
establishing the employees’ hours worked in a class action.”  
Id. at 1043, 1046–47, 1048 (finding the predominance element 
met because plaintiffs’ representative evidence was “sufficient 
to sustain a jury finding as to hours worked if it were 
introduced in each employee’s action”).   
Based on the District Court’s analysis before us, we 
cannot make a definitive determination as to whether 
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Plaintiffs’ representative evidence is sufficient to satisfy Rule 
23’s commonality and preponderance requirements.  First, 
from an evidentiary standpoint, we find it difficult to discern 
how the District Court arrived at its conclusion that Plaintiffs’ 
representative evidence was sufficient to establish either the 
existence of a companywide policy or Citizens’ knowledge of 
it.  The Special Master’s predominance analysis merely states 
that “Plaintiff[s] have demonstrated that the unofficial policy 
upon which their . . . claims are predicated is amenable to 
common proof and that this common question will 
predominate over any individualized questions,” and cites 
Plaintiffs’ “substantial evidence” in the form of testimony from 
“roughly two dozen MLOs.”  (App. 142).  Yet, the SM Reports 
do not specify what testimony in particular was relied upon to 
reach that conclusion.  The reports state that the “MLOs 
generally testify that, while Citizens maintained an official 
policy that required all hours worked to be reported and paid, 
and while Citizens officially required overtime to be requested 
and approved in advance, Citizens’ managers nonetheless 
regularly and almost uniformly instructed MLOs not to report 
all the hours that they worked.”  (Id. at 142-43).  Furthermore, 
the SM Reports do not provide any discussion at all regarding 
how Plaintiffs have shown that knowledge of the purported 
policy can be imputed to Citizens.  Such a barebones analysis, 
without citations to specific, factual support in the record, 
simply does not permit a reviewing court to conclude that the 
District Court in fact undertook the “rigorous” review 
mandated by our precedents.  
Moreover, it is unclear how the District Court 
reconciled contradictory testimony and other evidence 
explicitly undermining Plaintiffs’ assertion that Citizens 
maintained a companywide “policy-to-violate-the policy.”  For 
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example, not only were Plaintiffs’ experiences confined to 
interactions with specific managers in distinct offices, but their 
statements are dissimilar and oftentimes ambiguous, reflecting 
in many instances nothing more than typical workplace 
concerns about MLO work ethic and effectiveness.  See, e.g., 
Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]hen multiple managers exercise [arguably] independent 
discretion, conditions at different stores (or sites) do not 
present a common question.”).  For instance, Illinois MLO 
Valerie Dal Pino testified that, although her manager informed 
her and other MLOs that “overtime needed to be preapproved 
by [a] manager,” Dal Pino specifically stated that she was 
never instructed by her managers not to record “all of the hours 
that [she] worked in a work week[.]” (App. 2308, 51:9-12; 
53:13-22).  Similarly, Rhode Island MLO Cheryl Roach 
testified that she was instructed to “request pre-approval” 
before seeking overtime payment, but was never “den[ied] 
permission to work more than 40 hours.”  (Id. at 1909, 73:5-
29).  The same is true for several other Plaintiffs, including 
Ohio MLO Larry Heydon, (see id. at 2022, 62:19-22); Ohio 
MLO Teresa Fragale, (see id. at 1704, 69:15-19); and New 
Hampshire MLO William Ziminksy, (see id. at 2498, 95:21-
96:4).  Far from supporting the District Court’s assertion that 
MLOs “generally testified” to the existence of the unlawful 
policy and that their managers “almost uniformly” instructed 
MLOs not to report the hours they worked, the examples 
undermine commonality/predominance conclusions.  That is, 
in contrast to the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence in Tyson, 
Plaintiffs evidence here comes not from a similarly situated 
group of MLOs but from individual employees who worked in 
distinct offices at various times throughout the relevant class 
period.  Given the diversity of their testimony, we have serious 
doubts whether the evidence tendered by Plaintiffs is 
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sufficiently representative of the class as a whole such that each 
individual plaintiff “could have relied on [the] sample to 
establish liability if he or she had brought an individual action.”  
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47. 
Accordingly, the class certification order cannot stand.  
We will remand with instructions that the District Court 
conduct a “rigorous” examination of the factual and legal 
allegations underpinning Plaintiffs’ claims before deciding if 
class certification is appropriate.   
C. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction 
In addition to challenging the District Court’s Rule 23 
ruling, Citizens also contests the District Court’s non-final 
FLSA certification order under the doctrine of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction.  This doctrine “‘allows [us] in [our] 
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over issues that are not 
independently appealable but that are intertwined with issues 
over which [we] properly and independently exercise[] [our] 
jurisdiction.’”  Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 
F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 
202-03).  The doctrine is a narrow one that “should be used 
‘sparingly,’ and only when there is sufficient overlap in the 
facts relevant to both . . . issues to warrant plenary review.”  Id. 
(quoting E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 203 (internal quotation 
omitted)); see also In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 
375–76 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  Further, the doctrine 
is “available only to the extent necessary to ensure meaningful 
review of an unappealable order.”  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 
1994) as amended (Aug. 29, 1994) (citation omitted).    
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Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Swint v. 
Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (1995), we 
concluded that pendent appellate jurisdiction is restricted to 
two circumstances: (1) “inextricably intertwined” orders or (2) 
“review of [a] non-appealable order where it is necessary to 
ensure meaningful review of [an] appealable order.”  CTF 
Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 136 
(3d Cir. 2004) (citing E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 203).  “Issues 
are ‘inextricably intertwined’ only when the appealable issue 
‘cannot be resolved without reference to the otherwise 
unappealable issue.’”  Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 
F.3d 75, 88 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Soc’y for Testing & 
Materials v. Corrpro Companies, Inc., 478 F.3d 557, 580–81 
(3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted)).  “[T]he existence of an . . . 
appealable order [does not] confer pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over an otherwise unappealable order just because 
the two orders arise out of the same factual matrix . . .” even if 
considering the orders together may be encouraged under 
“considerations of efficiency.”   Hoxworth v. Blinder, 
Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 209 (3d Cir. 1990).  “[T]he 
pendent appellate jurisdiction standard is not satisfied when we 
are confronted with two similar, but independent, issues, and 
resolution of the non-appealable order would require us to 
conduct an inquiry that is distinct from and ‘broader’ than the 
inquiry required to resolve solely the issue over which we 
properly have appellate jurisdiction.”  Myers v. Hertz Corp., 
624 F.3d 537, 553-54 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Thus, 
if the appealable order may be properly “dispose[d] of . . . 
without venturing into otherwise nonreviewable matters[,]” 
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(en banc), we “have no need—and therefore no power—to 
examine the [nonreviewable] order,” Hoxworth, 903 F.3d at 
208. 
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Here, we must determine, as a matter of first impression, 
whether an order granting certification under Rule 23 is 
“inextricably intertwined” with an order granting final 
collective action certification under the FLSA.  Citizens claims 
that we may do so because review of the FLSA certification 
order is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the Rule 23 
order.  Plaintiffs maintain that, although we have jurisdiction 
to review the class certification order, our jurisdiction does not 
extend to the FLSA order because “Rule 23 actions are 
fundamentally different from collective actions under the 
FLSA” and thus cannot be considered “inextricably 
intertwined” for purposes of exercising pendent appellate 
jurisdiction. (Appellees’ Br. 55) (citations omitted).  
We find the Second Circuit’s opinion in Myers 
instructive on the issue.  There, after affirming the denial of 
class certification on predominance grounds, the Second 
Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s decision denying certification of an 
FLSA collective action because “the two rulings [were] . . . not 
‘inextricably intertwined.’”  Myers, 624 F.3d at 556.  
Specifically, the court found that the exercise of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction was unwarranted because the question of 
whether the potential plaintiffs had met the FLSA’s less 
burdensome “similarly situated” standard was “quite distinct 
from the question whether plaintiffs ha[d] satisfied the much 
higher [Rule 23 predominance] threshold. . . .”  Id. at 555–56.  
Although the court recognized that “the two issues . . . [were] 
admittedly similar,” it nevertheless concluded that the FLSA 
and Rule 23 certifications orders were not inextricably 
intertwined because the court “[could] easily[] determine[] that 
the higher predominance standard ha[d] not been met without 
addressing whether the same evidence plaintiffs have put 
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forward in support of Rule 23 class certification could satisfy 
the lower [FLSA] standard.”  Id. at 556. 
We join the Second Circuit and conclude that Rule 23 
certification is not “inextricably intertwined” with an FLSA 
collective action certification so as to permit us to exercise 
pendent appellate jurisdiction over the FLSA certification.  In 
so holding, we are persuaded by our prior precedent and the 
Second Circuit’s well-reasoned decision in Myers that Rule 23 
class certification and FLSA collective action certification are 
fundamentally different creatures.  Further, judicial efficiency 
notwithstanding, the myriad problems that could result from 
exercising jurisdiction in this context counsel against 
expanding the narrow doctrine of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction in the way Citizens proposes. 
To be sure, some of our sister Courts of Appeals have 
treated FLSA and Rule 23 certification as nearly one and the 
same.  See, e.g., Epenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 
770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here isn’t a good reason to have 
different standards for the certification of the two different 
types of action, and the case law has largely merged for the 
standards, though with some terminological differences . . . 
[and] so we can, with no distortion of our analysis, treat [both 
Rule 23 and FLSA actions] as if [they] were a single class 
action.”); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 
1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (opining that there is “little difference in 
the various approaches” for evaluating Rule 23 and FLSA 
certifications).  On the other hand, other courts have concluded 
that “[t]here [are] fundamental, irreconcilable difference[s]” 
between Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective actions that 
preclude treating them as interchangeable.  LaChapelle v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam).  For example, in a Rule 23 action “each person within 
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the [class] description is considered to be a class member and, 
as such is bound by the judgment . . . unless he has ‘opted out’ 
of the suit[,]” but [u]nder . . . [the FLSA,] no person can 
become a party plaintiff and no person will be bound by or may 
benefit from the judgment unless he has affirmatively ‘opted 
into’ the class[.]”  Id. (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court 
has also noted differences between Rule 23 class actions and 
FLSA collective actions, such as the fact that although “a 
putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is 
certified under Rule 23[,] [u]nder the FLSA . . . ‘conditional 
certification’ does not produce a class with an independent 
legal status, or join additional parties to the action.”  Symczyk, 
569 U.S. at 75. 
On balance, we believe that class certification under 
Rule 23 and collective action certification under the FLSA are 
not sufficiently similar or otherwise “inextricably intertwined” 
to justify exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.   This 
conclusion is supported by our decisions in Zavala v. Wal Mart 
Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2012), and Kershner, along 
with the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Thiessen.  When tasked 
with elucidating the standard to be applied on final certification 
under the FLSA in Zavala, we eschewed an approach derived 
from Rule 23, holding instead that the standard to be applied to 
determine whether FLSA final certification is appropriate is 
“whether the proposed collective plaintiffs are ‘similarly 
situated.’”  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 (citation omitted).  This 
approach makes sense because “Congress clearly chose not to 
have the Rule 23 standards apply to [statutory] class actions 
[such as those under the FLSA]” by adopting not a 
“commonality” or “predominance” requirement, but rather a 
finding that the collective plaintiffs are “similarly situated.”  
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105.  Holding otherwise would 
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“effectively ignore Congress’ directive.”  Id.  Thus, we have 
previously concluded that, whereas a class action ruling is 
grounded in the various procedural provisions found in Rule 
23, a collective action under the FLSA hinges on “whether the 
plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’ to 
the named plaintiffs.”  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 537 (citing Myers, 
624 F.3d at 555); see also Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 
1086, 1096 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is clear that the 
requirements for pursuing [an FLSA] class action are 
independent of, and unrelated to, the requirements for a class 
action under Rule 23[.]”).    
In practice, determining whether plaintiffs are 
“similarly situated” under the FLSA involves considering all 
relevant factors, such as, “whether the plaintiffs are employed 
in the same corporate department, division, and location; 
whether they advance similar claims; whether they seek 
substantially the same form of relief; and . . . [whether they 
have] individualized defenses.”  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536–37.  
Although we acknowledge that some of the factors and 
evidence necessary to satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23 and 
§ 216(b) may overlap and, as a consequence, our rulings with 
respect to them may overlap as well, “a mere nexus between 
the two orders is not sufficient to justify a decision to assume 
jurisdiction.”  Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449–50.  
Finally, limiting the exercise of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction avoids numerous potential problems that could 
arise through its use.  We stated in Kershner—as did the 
Second Circuit in Myers—that expanding the doctrine would 
serve to undermine the finality rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).  
See Myers, 624 F.3d at 556; Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449.  In 
particular, parties could abuse the doctrine by bringing 
“insubstantial interlocutory appeals in order to bring before 
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[us] issues which [we] ordinarily would not be able to review 
until a final decision of the district court.”  Myers, 624 F.3d at 
556.  Therefore, we hold that Rule 23 class certification and 
FLSA final collective action certification are not “inextricably 
intertwined.”  Accordingly, we decline to exercise pendent 
appellate jurisdiction over the FLSA collective action 
certification order in this case.       
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will leave 
undisturbed the District Court certifying a collective action 
under the FLSA, vacate the District Court’s order granting 
Plaintiff’s motion for class certification under Rule 23, and 
remand this matter for further proceedings. 
